INTRODUCTION
The legal profession has notoriously ignored the reality that a significant number of its members exhibit signs of serious mental illness (and become addicted or habituated to drugs or alcohol at levels that are statistically significantly elevated from levels of the public at large). This is no longer consideration of the paradox that our responses in these cohorts of cases are utterly dissonant with our responses to the crisis in the profession mentioned above.
I believe that the roots of this puzzle are found in the social attitude of sanism, an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character of other irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected in) prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry, infecting both our jurisprudence and our lawyering practices. Sanism is largely invisible and largely socially acceptable, is based predominantly upon stereotype, myth, superstition, and deindividualization, and is sustained and perpetuated by our use of alleged "ordinary common sense" (OCS) and heuristic reasoning in an unconscious response to events both in everyday life and in the legal process. 6 Just as lawyers are sanist towards clients with mental disabilities, they are sanist towards their peers with mental disabilities. And this sanism manifests itself in utterly inconsistent ways (ignoring the reality of mental illness in the practicing bar, blaming attorneys for their mental illness in disciplinary matters, and, again, ignoring the impact of mental illness on representation in the criminal trial process), an inconsistency that is a common mechanism that allows us to avoid confronting both the realities of mental disability and the stereotypical ways that we seek to deal with it in legal contexts. As I have argued elsewhere, "We tend to ignore, subordinate or trivialize behavioral research in this area, especially when acknowledging that such research would Neoconservative insanity defense and civil commitment reforms value psychiatric expertise when it contributes to the social control function of law and disparage it when it does not. In the criminal justice system, psychiatrists are now viewed skeptically as accomplices of defense lawyers who get criminals "off the hook" of responsibility. In the commitment system, however, they are more confidently seen as therapeutic helpers who get patients "on the hook" of treatment and control. The result will be increased institutionalization of the mentally ill and greater use of psychiatrists and other mental health professionals as powerful agents of social control.
Id.
8 be cognitively dissonant with our intuitive-albeit empirically flawed [-] views." 7 I have written frequently about the ways that therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ)-a means of studying the law as a therapeutic agent, recognizing that substantive rules, legal procedures and lawyers' roles may have either therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences -might be a redemptive tool in 8 efforts to combat sanism, as a means of "strip[ping] bare the law's sanist façade" and as a "powerful tool that will serve as a means of attacking and uprooting the we/they distinction that has traditionally plagued and stigmatized the mentally disabled." My friend, colleague, and co-presenter 9 Susan Daicoff has already done a herculean job of looking at lawyer-stress issues through a TJ filter; I hope in this paper to add to that by considering 10 squarely the impact of sanism on the underlying dilemmas.
This paper (1) briefly reviews the evidence as to rates of mental disability among practicing lawyers, the state of ADA law as it relates to lawyers with mental disability, and the caselaw that has emerged in the criminal procedure context with regard to ineffectiveness of counsel issues; (2) explains sanism and describes its impact upon the legal system with special attention paid to the narrow but important issue of its impact on lawyers with mental A more recent government study suggests that the rate of major depressive disorders among lawyers has diminished somewhat in recent years. SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SVCS. ADMIN., U.S. disabilities; (3) speculates as to why lawyers are as susceptible (or more susceptible) to sanism's pernicious power as others; and then (4) considers how an application of TJ principles to this problem may eventually have a redemptive effect.
My title for this paper comes from Bob Dylan's Mama, You Been on My Mind, a song written in 1964 but not released officially by Dylan until 1991.
11
Characterized by Oliver Trager in his definitive Dylan encyclopedia as "simply a great love song" with "gorgeous melody and cascading almost incantatory lyrics of romance and inevitable separation," the song includes 12 this verse:
When you wake up in the mornin', baby, look inside your mirror. You know I won't be next to you, you know I won't be near. I'd just be curious to know if you can see yourself as clear As someone who has had you on his mind.
13
Lawyers and the legal system fail miserably at "looking inside [ It is almost too obvious to state that if our operant paradigms, teaching methods, or other practices exert pressures that undermine the physical health, internal values, intrinsic motivation, and/or experience of security, self-worth, authenticity, competence, and relatedness of our students, we should expect the negative results that studies of law students (and lawyers) consistently demonstrate: major deficits in well-being, life satisfaction, and enthusiasm, and flourishing depression, anxiety, and cynicism. Id.
of practicing attorneys have reported "having a disability" suggests the 22 enormity of this problem. I recognize that many states have compulsory or optional continuing legal education dealing with alcoholism and substance abuse issues among attorneys. But my sense-based on a combination of 23 research and anecdote-suggests to me that this remains an issue that is still, at best, under the radar for many or, at worst, the subject of a "don't ask, don't tell" attitude.
There is no doubt that these are frightening statistics, and at this point in time they should be a surprise to no one. But what is perhaps more frightening is the reality that very few of us seem to notice or care. It is not a coincidence, I think, that one of the bar journal articles-about impaired judges -is titled What we are paying attention to, however, is the intersection between mental disability and a cluster of other issues:
• the impact of such mental disability on bar disciplinary proceedings; 30 • the application of the ADA to such matters, and to the bar examination process; 31 and • the role of a lawyer's mental disability in a defendant's appeal of a criminal conviction in which the defendant alleges he was denied effective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington.
32
In each of these scenarios, questions of mental disability are raised and evaluated, often with apparently inconsistent results. Bar discipline cases often talk about mental illness as if it were curable in precisely the same way that a sore throat or cold is curable and reject mitigation arguments unless 33 lawyers can "prove that the risk of continued substance abuse causing future acts of misconduct is virtually nonexistent. powerful current of blame: claims of mitigation are rejected on the basis that the initial use of alcohol and drugs was voluntary. Decisions in these cases 35 eerily track decisions under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that reject arguments seeking mitigation in the sentencing process unless the defendant's mental disability mimics that of an insanity defense (usually, that he cannot tell right from wrong). In short, the assessment by a student author-"[u]ntil 36 recently, the profession has preferred to ignore the possibility of rehabilitation for mentally ill attorneys[; i]nstead, courts have drummed them out of the profession" -appears to be frighteningly accurate.
37
The phrase "until recently" used by the author in the article just cited refers to a (partial) change that has followed the passage of the ADA. Yet, As Professor Susan Stefan has perceptively noted, courts routinely find mentally disabled women incompetent to engage in sexual intercourse (i.e., to lack sufficient competence to engage knowingly and voluntarily in such behavior), but just as routinely find such individuals competent to consent to give their children up for adoption. In one startling case, a court made both of these findings simultaneously about the same woman. Id. (footnote omitted)) most stunning example is the case of Bellamy v. Cogdell. In Bellamy, a 60 death penalty case, counsel-who was subject to a disciplinary hearing to determine whether he should still be able to practice law (because of his incapacity)-was allowed to continue representing his client. Due to a 61 finding of mental impairment, trial counsel was thus initially disqualified from defending himself in his own disciplinary hearing. To be able to continue 62 representing his client in Bellamy, he promised he would only serve in an advisory capacity to competent lead counsel. However, as that lead counsel 63 was unable to attend the trial, the same attorney who was mentally incompetent to defend himself was allowed to defend someone else charged with murder, and that representation in that trial was deemed effective assistance of counsel under the Strickland test.
These decisions are 64 consistent with other decisions affirming convictions involving defendants whose attorneys fell asleep in court, came to court inebriated, etc.
65
Judges' refusals to consider the meaning and realities of mental illness cause them to act in what appears, at first blush, to be contradictory and inconsistent ways, and teleologically, to privilege (where that privileging 66 serves what they perceive as a socially-beneficial value) and subordinate (where that subordination serves what they perceive as a similar value) evidence of mental illness. Thus, it is no surprise that courts that regularly 67 engage in gross stereotyping with regard to the impact of mental illness on behavior in the context of the sentencing of persons convicted of crime or facing involuntary civil commitment, similarly minimize it in cases where 68 recognition of that impact might lead to a socially-undesirable result, such as an insanity acquittal, where this tactic allows them to engage in greater 69 social control. In this instance, sanist behavior leads to pretextual outcomes.
When these cohorts of cases are read together, some common threads can be teased out:
• there is absolutely no indication that the statistics regarding the high incidence of lawyer dysfunction discussed earlier are known (or, if known, are of interest) to the judges deciding the cases; • there is substantial blame of lawyers with mental disabilities, often accompanied by thinly-veiled suggestions that their disability was their fault; 70 • courts simply do not want to acknowledge that the non-discrimination principles of the ADA apply to attorney discipline matters, though they are grudgingly 71 beginning to "get" that they apply to bar application questionnaire cases; and • the desire to uphold criminal convictions against Strickland attacks leads to behavior that is-there is no other descriptor-utterly pretextual. 72 In an article about the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that I co-authored with Professor Keri Gould some twelve years ago, this was our conclusion: The cases reported so far reflect no coherent reading of the Guidelines and no real understanding of the role of mental disability, short of an exculpating insanity defense, in criminal behavior. Federal judges are remarkably inconsistent in their reading of mental disability. The caselaw[] suggests that federal judges have not seriously considered the way mental disability should be assessed in sentencing decisions, and that random decisions generally reflect a judge's "ordinary common sensical read" of whether an individual defendant "really" could have overcome his disability.
We contend that this is caused by several factors: (1) a lack of understanding on the part of federal judges and defense counsel as to the meaning of mental disability and its potential interrelationship with criminal behavior; . . . (3) the structure of the insanity defense as an all-or-nothing alternative, causing many to believe that lesser evidence of mental disorder is simply an insufficient factor to consider in sentencing decisions.
74
I believe that judicial (and social) attitudes in the sorts of cases that I am discussing here track these attitudes almost precisely. In that context, we concluded then that the "pernicious forces" of sanism and pretextuality drove the developments on which we reported. I believe the same forces are at 75 play here.
II. ON SANISM
Sanism permeates all aspects of mental disability law and affects all participants in the mental disability law system-litigants, fact finders, counsel, and expert and lay witnesses. Its corrosive effects have warped 76 mental disability law jurisprudence in involuntary civil commitment law, institutional law, tort law, and all aspects of the criminal process (pretrial, trial, and sentencing We must consider sanism hand-in-glove with pretextuality. "Pretextuality" means that courts accept (either implicitly or explicitly) testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest (and frequently meretricious) decision-making, specifically where witnesses, especially expert witnesses, show a high propensity to purposely distort their testimony in order to achieve desired ends. "This pretextuality is poisonous; it infects all 79 participants in the judicial system, breeds cynicism and disrespect for the law, demeans participants, and reinforces shoddy lawyering, blasé judging, and, at times, perjurious and/or corrupt testifying."
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In another article (dealing primarily with the impact of sanism on clinical education), I asserted that sanism permeates the legal representation process both in cases in which mental capacity is a central issue and those in which such capacity is a collateral question. I found that "[s]anist lawyers (1) distrust their mentally disabled clients, (2) trivialize their complaints, (3) fail to forge authentic attorney-client relationships with such clients and reject their clients' potential contributions to case-strategizing, and (4) take less seriously case outcomes that are adverse to their clients." 81 The pretexts of the forensic mental health system are reflected both in the testimony of forensic experts and in the decisions of legislators and factfinders. Experts frequently testify in accordance with their own selfreferential concepts of "morality" and openly subvert statutory and case-law criteria that impose rigorous behavioral standards as predicates for commitment or that articulate functional standards as prerequisites for an incompetency-to-stand-trial finding. Often this testimony is further warped by a heuristic bias. Expert witnesses-like the rest of us-succumb to the seductive allure of simplifying cognitive devices in their thinking and employ such heuristic gambits as the vividness effect or attribution theory in their testimony. This testimony is then weighed and evaluated by frequently sanist fact-finders. Judges and jurors, both consciously and unconsciously, often rely on reductionist, prejudice-driven stereotypes in their decision-making, thus subordinating statutory and case law standards as well as the legitimate interests of the mentally disabled persons who are the subject of the litigation. Judges' predispositions to employ the same sorts of heuristics as do expert witnesses further contaminate the process.
As I have previously noted:
I believe that these two concepts have controlled-and continue to control-modern mental disability law. Just as importantly (perhaps, more importantly), they continue to exert this control invisibly. This invisibility means that the most important aspects of mental disability law-not just the law "on the books," but, more importantly, the law in action and practice-remains hidden from the public discussions about mental disability law.
82
These attitudes corrupt the entire process of dealing with lawyers who have mental disabilities. Because, socially, we encourage punishment for those who demonstrate a "lack of effort" or are "responsible" for their failure, we 83 blind ourselves willfully to the realities of mental illness, to the "gray areas" of human behavior, and to behavioral, scientific, cultural, and empirical 84 realities. As a result of this self-inflicted blindness, we blame lawyers with 85 mental disabilities for their status, we minimize the impact of mental disabilities on their actions, and we-in criminal cases-allow this minimization to pretextually affirm convictions of defendants whose trials did not meet the minimum levels of decency that the criminal justice system demands. It is no coincidence that, in the bar cases, we employ language 86 that reflects the most sanist language employed in criminal cases. 87 There is a massive database that tells us of the extent to which the problem of stigma continues to pervade all aspects of society. Our refusal 88 to confront the extent to which mental disability (and alcoholism and substance abuse) affect the bar, the inevitable impact those conditions have on legal practice and the lives of practitioners continue to reflect sanist behaviors and attitudes, as do decisions that impute blame to those with such disabilities. Our abject failure to acknowledge the ways that this willful 89 blindness corrupts the criminal justice system exacerbates this shameful state of affairs.
III. LAWYERS' SUSCEPTIBILITY TO SANISM
There is, to be sure, some irony in all this. Lawyers-whose job it is to provide effective representation to all their clients-fall prey to the same sanist and pretextual contaminants that distort the actions of other players in the judicial system. Just as judges and jurors "frequently rely on reductionist, prejudice-driven stereotypes in their decision-making, thus subordinating statutory and caselaw standards as well as the legitimate interests of the mentally disabled persons who are the subject of the litigation," so do IV. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE TJ questions whether legal rules, procedures, and roles can or should be reshaped so as to enhance their therapeutic potential while preserving due process principles. Elsewhere, I have suggested that TJ has the capacity to Because of its emphasis on psychological well-being, interpersonal dynamics and relationships, and human behavior, TJ/PL offers [dissatisfied] lawyers a way to optimize their strengths, to use their special humanistic and caring skills, and to practice law in an ultimately satisfying way that has beneficial effects on all involved.
With TJ/PL, the lawyer can finally "do good," help people, prevent harm, avoid interpersonal conflict, build and maintain relationships instead of tear them asunder, and become a positive force in people's lives rather than a necessary and often-hated evil.
Furthermore, at least some, if not all, lawyers and clients desperately need to experience the lawyer-client interaction as a positive, healing experience. TJ/PL offers one avenue to this end because it explicitly values mental health concerns, emotional consequences, and interpersonal relationships inherent in many legal matters. 97 There is no question that the current state of affairs is abjectly antitherapeutic to virtually all who are touched by the legal system-lawyers, clients, the general public. I believe there are several remedial steps we can take-in addition to the ones initially set out so clearly and eloquently a decade ago by Professor Daicoff -to ameliorate current conditions. 98 Consider the following:
1. We must acknowledge-openly and candidly-the extent to which disability and addiction permeate the profession and affect the practice of law. Acknowledgment of this reality should not be limited to articles in local bar journals. The topic should be added to scholarly agendas of academics, and national bar leaders should take the lead in initiating a national, top-priority conversation on this question.
2. In bar disciplinary hearings, decision-makers should abandon the culture of blame that they have embraced; should avoid parallels to insanity 99 defense standards, burdens of proof in criminal trials, malingering fears, and federal sentencing guideline mitigation standards; and should rather seek to enter orders in such cases that are at once protective of the public, but also sensitive to the realities of mental illness and addiction-driven behavior.
3. These approaches should be implemented in ADA cases in this area of law and practice as well. 100 4. It is hard to imagine a more anti-therapeutic case than Strickland. Criminal defendants whose lawyers fall asleep in court or come to court inebriated, and who are then convicted, and whose appeals are rejected
